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RESUMO O presente artigo pretende enquadrar a questão do 
relacionamento entre budismo e ciência num âmbito histórico e filosófico 
mais amplo do que foi levado em consideração até agora pela scholarship 
internacional. A perspectiva histórica permite concluir que a narrativa que 
liga budismo e ciência não é baseada em características intrínsecas ao 
pensamento budista, mas floresceu em dependência do desenvolvimento da 
dialética religião-ciência dos séculos XVIII e XIX. A perspectiva filosófica, 
em contrapartida, permite concluir que essa mesma narrativa é sustentada 
por um pensamento de cunho metafísico e cientista, que nega a especificidade 
tanto da ciência quanto do budismo.
Palavras-chave Cientismo, religião, positivismo, metafísica, Donald S. 
Lopez Jr, modernismo budista.
ABSTRACT The present article aims at setting the issue of the 
relationship between Buddhism and science in a historical and philosophical 
frame wider than that one taken into account by the international scholarship 
so far. The historical point of view allows us to conclude that the narrative that 
connects Buddhism with science is not based on features intrinsic to Buddhist 
thought. In fact, such narrative prospered thanks to the development of a 
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dialectic, typical of the 18th and 19th centuries, between science and religion. 
The philosophical point of view allows us to conclude that such narrative 
is backed by a metaphysical-like thought that denies the specificity of both 
science and Buddhism.
Keywords Scientism, religion, Positivism, metaphysics, Donald S. Lopez 
Jr., Buddhist modernism. 
With the goal of better understanding and assessing the current situation 
of Buddhism, characterized in recent decades by its remarkable expansion 
throughout the world, it would be useful to examine in detail – and in historical 
perspective – the relationship Buddhism has with science. in a prominent 
book, Lopez (2008) takes on this question in a broad treatment. i had analyzed 
more synthetically the same subject in an article two years earlier (Lo turco, 
2006). the two works present an analogous argumentative arch: through the 
re-examination of relevant episodes in the history of the conjunction between 
Buddhism and science, one can reach the conclusion that the affinity implied 
by this conjunction should be considered problematic. it appears to have been 
assumed more on a foundation of prejudice and on an apologetic strategy than 
on actual similarity (Lo turco, 2006, p. 49; Lopez, 2008, p. 216). indeed, 
surprisingly, the historical variability of the meanings of the terms ‘Buddhism’ 
and ‘science’ does not seem to interfere with the solidity of this connection 
between the two (Lo turco, 2006, pp. 44-45; Lopez, 2008, pp. xii, 2-3, 31-32). 
On top of that, one can affirm that the alleged affinity with science prevents 
us from grasping the specificity of Buddhism (Lo Turco, 2006, p. 49; Lopez, 
2008, p. xiii). With the present contribution i intend to demonstrate how the 
understanding of the phenomenon of the conjunction between Buddhism and 
science which Lopez (2008) arrives at, in large part similar to the conclusions 
of Lo turco (2006), can be supplemented by its insertion in both a broad 
historical perspective and a conceptual framework that is more adequate to 
our times.
the main reference framework proposed by Lopez (2008) seems to be the 
Buddhist belief system itself, as witnessed by the fact that he declares at the 
end of the book – and therefore at a crucial point – that the work was written 
with the intention to avoid that accepting the conjunction between Buddhism 
and science would diminish the historical figure of the Buddha (Lopez, 2008, 
p. 216). now, this position has the obvious problem of being acceptable only 
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by those who take their place within some area of the diversified Buddhist 
faith. nevertheless, the idea of a connection of any kind between Buddhism 
and science is too widespread, too much an integral part of popular culture (cf. 
Lopez, 2010, pp. 884-885), to be of concern only to Buddhists. in addition, 
a varied current of thought, which begins in the 19th century, maintains 
that Buddhism could represent nothing less than the solution to the age-
old problem, perceived as characteristic of Western history, of the conflict 
between science and religion.1 If Buddhism is the solution to this conflict, it is 
not a secondary question for anyone who is interested in the dialectic between 
science and religion and its history. in this regard, we will maintain in the 
course of the current article that the conjunction of Buddhism with science is 
a historically and conceptually untenable construction. in fact, the connection 
is nourished both by a lack of consideration for the events that brought it 
about and by the framework of that metaphysical thought that should, by now, 
be outdated by the ‘linguistic turn’ (understood in its broadest sense). So, 
Buddhism cannot represent the solution for the conflict between religion and 
science. nevertheless, while the conjunction between Buddhism and science 
is indefensible, this is not due to the fact that Buddhism contains elements that 
are ‘premodern’, while existing science is, by definition, ‘modern’, as Lopez 
(2008, p. 216) would want it. A similar argumentative line, still dependent on 
a metaphysical-positivistic framework, would only promote the effacement of 
the specificity of Buddhism (which is exactly what Lopez wanted to avoid). 
Secondly, we intend to refute a line of objection to Lopez (2008) according 
to which, despite the shaky historical premises of the conjunction between 
Buddhism and science, all in all a grain of truth can be found in the idea 
of an affinity between the two disciplines (Loizzo, 2010, p. 108; see also 
Hammerstrom, 2010, p. 251), which allegedly explains the good fortune this 
conjunction still enjoys today.
it has already been asserted in Lo turco (2006) and in Lopez (2008) 
that, in order to have an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon of the 
conjunction between Buddhism and science, one must first re-examine 
its history. those who have theorized and, at times, put into practice this 
conjunction have presupposed that it could have only occurred along 
necessary guidelines, imposed as they were by the nature, or by the essence, 
or by the structure, in part shared, of the areas of human knowledge labeled as 
‘Buddhism’ and ‘science’. in reality, the opinions about how these guidelines 
1 For more on the history of the relationship between Buddhism and science also see Verhoeven (2001), 
Cabezón (2003), Harrison (2006, pp. 96-97), McMahan (2008, pp. 89-116).
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had to be configured revealed themselves to be considerably varied. Cabezón 
(2003, p. 41 ff.), in summarizing the question, indentifies three historical 
configurations of the conjunction between Buddhism and science: “conflict/
ambivalence, identity/similarity, and complementarity”. Apparently, the idea 
of a conjunction between Buddhism and science was born in the second 
half of the 19th century, when Buddhist apologists had to demonstrate how 
accusations of superstition – typically directed at Buddhism by Christian 
missionaries for the purpose of colonialist propaganda – were unjustified 
(cf. Lopez, 2008, pp. 53-54). the solution that these apologists adopted 
was to present Buddhism as essentially scientific, resorting to the ‘identity/
similarity’ rhetoric.2 this position, apart from allowing obvious demands of 
political independence, effectively responded to the slanderous propaganda 
of Christian missionaries. In fact, it also implied that Buddhism was able to 
meet the need of the Westerners for religiosity without contradicting their 
increasingly strong belief, conscious or not, in the preeminence of science in 
all branches of knowledge. Buddhist apologists therefore took advantage of 
a characteristic break in Western consciousness, i.e., the rift between science 
and religion, which had brought about a prolonged crisis in Christianity (cf. 
McMahan, 2004). the move of Buddhist apologists worked so well that the 
idea of the scientific nature of Buddhism is still popular today.3
it is not possible to ignore how the elaboration of the conception of a 
conjunction between Buddhism and science required a masterful operation 
of repression (in a psychological sense), consisting in the exclusion from 
‘real Buddhism’ of a large quantity of canonical texts and a large part of 
the Buddhism actually practiced in Asian countries with all of its ritual and 
devotional implications. this orientation is known as ‘Protestant Buddhism’ or 
‘Buddhist modernism’: taking shape at the end of the 19th century, it highlights 
some texts and doctrines that are apparently compatible with a rationalistic 
vision and separates them from the context of practices, rituals and devotion. 
those texts and doctrines are interpreted as manifestations of the original, pure 
Buddhism that, in time, had been more and more misrepresented by popular 
2	 The	case	of	Dharmapāla	is	typical;	see	Lopez	(2008,	pp.	191-192).
3	 Lopez’s	 (2008)	 critics	 themselves	move	 from	positions	 that	 are	 still	 those	 that	 assume	similarity/identity	
or	 complementarity	 (cf.	 Lopez,	 2010,	 pp.	 884-885),	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 Lopez’s	 entire	 book	 clearly	
demonstrates that the combination of Buddhism and science was partly born out of misunderstanding, partly 
as	a	pretext,	and	continued	to	prosper	despite	this	shaky	foundation.	For	example,	Loizzo	(2010,	p.	109)	
writes	regarding	the	“tradition	of	Shakyamūni”	(sic):	“Its	accessibility	to	people	of	both	scientific	and	spiritual	
bent and its ability to engage both popular and professional interest seem to hold real promise for helping 
heal	the	split	between	mundane	science	and	spiritual	wisdom	that	plague	the	West”.	This	is	an	excellent	
example of the rhetoric of complementarity.
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superstition. this vision has continued until today in common descriptions of 
Buddhism, typical of popular literature, as pure ‘science’ or ‘philosophy’ – an 
idea in obvious and strident contrast with the textual tradition.4 All of this 
seems to have been sufficiently clarified by scholars.5
nevertheless, it has not been adequately emphasized that the same 
intellectual vicissitudes that are at the origin of the presentation of Buddhism 
as scientific led to a claim of scientific nature on the part of Hindu movements. 
this claim remains today, even if it seems to be discussed less by scholars. 
Who has never come across common oxymoronic combinations such as ‘the 
science of mantras’ or ‘the science of yoga’ in reference to some Hindu school 
or current? Hindu reformers very soon started to deal with the same problems 
as Buddhist reformers. Actually, the strategy of the Buddhist apologists was 
not that original, as they repeated what was already being done by Hindu 
reformers. the typical accusations of superstition, passivity, quietism and 
nihilism counted equally for Hinduism and Buddhism. in fact, for a long time 
the two were grouped together as targets of the same blame – or, more rarely, 
the same praise –, as if they were more or less equivalents.6
in reality, the history of the construction of the connection between 
science and indian religions has two concomitant factors at its root, one 
nearer and evident, already mentioned, and one more remote: not only the 
understandable apologetic necessity to present the religions of indian origin 
in a favorable light – and at the time of the birth of the association between 
Buddhism and science nothing enjoyed greater prestige in Western society 
than science, appearing nearly omnipotent, whose hegemony was taking the 
place of religion in human affairs – but also the belief that India was the cradle 
of Western civilization. this belief derived historically from the vision that the 
first figures of the Enlightenment had of India, which was well exemplified by 
the ideas of Voltaire (cf. Mohan, 2005). He maintained that the ancient indian 
4	 This	type	of	description	goes	from	the	usual	simplistic	presentations	typical	of	a	popularized	version,	like	that	
of	Thurman,	who	strains	to	present	Tibetan	Buddhism	as	a	science	tout	court	(see	Lopez,	1988,	pp.	81-82)	
or	Wallace	(2003,	p.	58),	who	seems	to	assert	that	Buddhism	made	use	of	scientific	experiments	well	before	
Galileo,	to	more	considered	philosophical	interpretations,	like	that	of	Batchelor	(1997,	p.	15),	who	speaks	
about	Buddhism	as	an	“existential,	therapeutic,	and	liberating	agnosticism”.
5	 On	 “Protestant	 Buddhism”,	 or	 however	 one	 wants	 to	 call	 it,	 see	 especially	 Bechert	 (1973,	 pp.	 91-92),	
Gombrich	and	Obeyesekere	(1988),	Prothero	(1995),	Baumann	(1997),	Seager	(1999,	pp.	232-236,	241-
248), McMahan (2008).
6 To cite some excellent examples, Hegel associated Buddhism and Hindu yoga in his criticism, while 
Schopenhauer	 proclaimed	 that	 his	 philosophy	 agreed	 with	 both	 Vedānta	 and	 Buddhism,	 despite	 the	
obvious doctrinal incompatibility between the two (see Halbfass, 1988, pp. 92, 111-116). More recently, the 
Theosophical	Society,	which	had	an	important	part	in	fostering	the	link	between	Buddhism	and	science	(see	
Lopez,	2008,	p.	156),	still	did	not	substantially	distinguish	between	Buddhism	and	Brahmanism	(see	Bevir,	
1994,	pp.	757-758).
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religion (and Chinese as well), unlike others, was not barbaric, in spite of 
the subsequent corruption provoked by fanaticism.7 this religion, conformed 
to reason, was free from superstition and consisted of the cult of a supreme 
being.8 In the final analysis, Christian theology for Voltaire was nothing more 
than a faded version of the one from ancient india.9 Furthermore, he saw 
India as the first organized society.10 Ancient india had fostered, in short, the 
unitary foundation of civilization and religion. When, much later, the leader 
of the Theosophical Society Helena Blavatsky affirmed in her Isis unveiled 
(II, p. 30) that “... India was the Alma-Mater [sic], not only of the civilization, 
arts, and sciences, but also of all the great religions of antiquity”, she was 
saying nothing new. therefore the cornerstone of the strategy adopted by 
the Hindus and Buddhist apologists was already available from the time of 
enlightenment. that position was more or less consciously adopted by the 
first British orientalists, like William Jones (who was known to Voltaire), 
Charles Wilkins and Henry Thomas Colebrook (see Halbfass, 1988, p. 62; 
Murray, 2006, p. 136). Certainly, then, even an early reformer of Hinduism 
like Ram Mohan Roy, creator of the Brahmo Sabhā (which subsequently 
changed its name to Brahmo Samāj), had a relevant role in the diffusion on the 
Indian subcontinent of the vision, influenced by Enlightenment thought, of an 
india that, during its Golden Age, was the cradle of religion and reason. this 
pristine splendor was subsequently corrupted and obscured by the progressive 
prevalence of idolatry. More precisely, ram Mohan roy tried to demonstrate 
how the idea of reason – understood precisely in enlightenment terms – was 
already present in the Vedānta, intended not only as a philosophical doctrine, 
but also literally as the ‘final section of the Veda’, and therefore as the whole 
of the Upaniṣads. On these grounds he attacked the Hinduism of his times, 
which he considered as having fallen into superstitious practices, or rather 
not conforming to reason (see torri, 2000, pp. 417-420). therefore, in his 
reformist work, Mohan roy depended on the enlightenment vision. He had 
already laid the groundwork for a Hindu reform movement in 1815 (see kopf, 
1979, pp. 9-11, 14). Almost at the same time, in 1816, the Count of Moira, the 
7	 “...	l’ancienne	religion	de	l’Inde,	et	celle	des	lettrés	à	la	Chine,	sont	les	seules	dans	lesquelles	les	hommes	
n’aient	point	été	barbares”.	Philosophie de l’histoire, p. 79.
8	 “...	 elle	 ne	 consistait	 que	 dans	 le	 culte	 pur	 d’un	Être	 suprême,	 dégagé	 de	 toute	 superstition	 et	 de	 tout	
fanatisme”. Œuvres complètes. Essai sur les mœurs, p. 190.
9	 “...	une	misérable	et	 froide	copie	de	 l’ancienne	théologie	 indienne”.	Œuvres complètes. Correspondance 
avec les souverains,	p.	560.
10	 “S’il	est	permis	de	faire	des	conjectures,	les	Indiens	vers	le	Gange	sont	peut-être	les	plus	anciennement	
rassemblés	en	 corps	de	peuple”.	Philosophie de l’histoire,	 p.	 75.	See	also	Voltaire,	Œuvres complètes. 
Histoire du parlement de Paris, et fragmens [sic] historiques sur l’Inde,	p.	327	ff.
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Governor-General of India, approved the founding of the Hindu College in 
Calcutta. This served the purpose of teaching the children of Indian notables 
not only indian languages, english and european literature, but also Western 
science. The “experiment in cultural fusion” (Kopf, 1979, p. 48) received a 
new stimulus in 1823, with the founding of the Sanskrit College, once again in 
Calcutta. Among the students at the college was Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar, a 
central figure of the Bengal Renaissance, and for a time the secretary of Brahmo 
Samāj in Calcutta. He was a rationalist, but looked to support his rationalism 
with Hindu writings; he was considered a good Hindu, but also proclaimed 
to be an atheist. in 1851, when Vidyasagar became principal of the Sanskrit 
College, he eliminated mathematical, scientific and philosophical texts from 
the Sanskrit curriculum that were not in keeping with the scientific knowledge 
of the age (see kopf, 1979, pp. 47, 56). this was, evidently, an attempt to 
couple religious (or, in any event, traditional) texts and rationalism analogous 
to that which was subsequently embarked upon by Buddhist reformers.
the romantic movement, seemingly antithetical to the enlightenment, 
inherited from the latter an enthusiasm for the india of the distant past. it 
was especially the late-romantic Max Müller, whose work had an immense 
reverberation in india, who served as a contact point between european 
interests for Vedic india and the works of Hindu reformers. He, among those 
who inspired theosophical ideas, maintained that real religion was scientific 
and equipped with an underlying universal essence (see Halbfass, 1988, p. 
259).
the ideas about the coincidence of religion and science caused a great stir 
in the Indian world. For example, according to Dayānanda Sarasvatī, Hindu 
reformer and founder of the Ārya Samāj, the Vedic golden age was not only 
abundant in wisdom and moral virtue, as any paṇḍit could have learned from the 
texts of the Dharmaśāstra, but it was also advanced in science and technology – 
all of which was testified to by the mention, typical of epic literature, of flying 
vehicles and equipment used in war. According to Dayānanda, knowledge and 
science had the Āryavarta as their radiating center. And still, Indians were 
unable to preserve that revelation in its purest form (see Halbfass, 1988, 
pp. 245-246; Jordens, 1998, p. 70; Torri, 2000, p. 456). Dayānanda’s thesis, 
despite its affinity with that of Max Müller, was so extreme that it provoked 
Müller’s reproach (see Menant, 1907, p. 301). Vivekananda, another influential 
reformer of Hinduism, founder of the Ramakrishna Mission, affirmed that 
modern science echoed Vedantic philosophy and that the sciences of arithmetic 
and astronomy had already taken shape in the Vedas (see Halbfass, 1988, pp. 
233-234; Verhoeven, 2001, p. 5). Again, one of the main preoccupations of 
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the neo-Vedantin reformer Swami rama tirtha was the comparison between 
Hinduism and the more popular scientific ideas of his times; he affirmed that 
Hinduism, understood correctly, reconciles science, philosophy and religion. 
More specifically, on the one hand the Vedānta can be understood through 
scientific experimentation, on the other, true scientific discoveries must be in 
harmony with the Vedānta (Rinehart, 1996, pp. 238-240).
if such ideas bring us back to the category ‘identity/similarity’, a later 
thread of the discourse on the conjunction between Hinduism and science 
can bring us back to the category of ‘complementarity’. one can take, for 
example, the well-known point of view on yoga, Vedānta and Tantrism of 
figures like Aurobindo and Radhakrishnan. They maintained that if Westerners 
were the best at exploring the physical world, indians were superior, and as 
scientific, in the exploration of the inner world. Such ideas were also shared 
and popularized by well-known Western thinkers like John Woodroffe (see 
Halbfass, 1988, pp. 399-400). it was thought that science, on the one hand, and 
yoga, or Vedānta, or Tantrism, on the other, have a methodology in common, 
and with this common basis scientists could learn more about the inner world 
– e.g. a non-mechanistic vision of consciousness – while yogins could expand 
and clarify their knowledge of the outer world. 
Clearly, among the Hindu reformers the idea of a more or less broad 
overlap of modern science on the one hand, and Vedic religion, or specific 
Hindu doctrines like Vedānta, Yoga or Tantrism, on the other, became almost 
commonplace. it was the Hindu reformers and apologists that adopted, even 
before the Buddhists, the strategy of reinterpreting their own tradition as 
fundamentally rationalistic and scientific in spite of its superstitious deposits. 
in doing so, they demonstrated that they had grasped the cultural peculiarity 
that was both the strength and the weakness of Western civilization: the 
hegemony of the cognitive model proposed by the natural sciences. this 
hegemony voided the credibility of any knowledge that did not depend on the 
scientific method. The Hindu reformers understood that all of Hinduism, a vast 
and extraordinarily varied intellectual tradition, risked being excluded from 
all the possible claims to truth due to positivistic and eurocentric prejudices, 
and being discredited as fideistic strangeness, circumscribed to the domain of 
scholarly curiosity. All of this could be avoided by recognizing that Hinduism 
had a kind of scientific status. Exactly like ‘scientific Buddhism’, though less 
so, ‘scientific Hinduism’ had its own dose of fortune in the modern West.11 
11	 For	example,	it	is	not	rare	that	popular	works	implausibly	place	the	philosophico-religious	thought	of	ancient	
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if the claims of compatibility between Buddhism and science seem to 
have begun in the late 19th century – and, in any event, only in this era does the 
West begin to better distinguish a Buddhism that is clearly separate from other 
‘indian religions’ (see Lopez, 2010, p. 885) – their ideological basis existed 
much earlier, at least in the age of the enlightenment. And this ideological 
basis acted as much on Hinduism as on Buddhism. Buddhist modernism 
does not appear before 1870, with the public debates between Buddhists and 
Christian missionaries (see Bechert, 1973, p. 91), and only after the analogous 
‘Hindu modernism’. Besides, everyone, both Buddhists and Hindus, made use 
of the orientalist discourse, turning it inside out to their own advantage and 
thereby realizing what has been appropriately called ‘inverted orientalism’ 
(Borup, 2004; Harrison, 2006, p. 97).
The characterization of Indian religions as scientific appeared nearly 
incontestable in the West because it was encouraged from the beginning 
by apparently ‘authorized’ exponents who came from countries that were 
traditionally Hindu or Buddhist. in reality, all of these were exponents of reform 
movements already largely influenced both by universalistic conceptions of 
Western origins and by the enormous intellectual prestige science enjoyed 
in the 19th century. in the West, characterizations of indian religions already 
adapted to Western tastes flourished, but Westerners, oblivious to the history 
of the reform movements, mistook them for genuinely traditional (cf. Gregory, 
2001, p. 252).
Although, according to Lopez (2008, p. 3), “there is clearly something 
about Buddhism that has sustained its long conjunction with the word science”, 
there is nothing in this context that substantially differentiates Buddhism 
from Hinduism – except perhaps the particularly bizarre insistence of some 
Hindu reformers on the technological more than the theoretical aspects of 
scientific progress: many Western inventions of the 19th century were thought 
to be nothing more than rediscoveries of what had already been realized 
thousands of years before in india. there is, rather, reason to believe that 
the conjunction between Buddhism and science does not originally depend 
on any necessitating factor. Again, according to Lopez (2008, p. 35) it was 
the Western biased perception of Buddhism as “the religion that is not a 
religion” that welded its bond to science. one can recognize that this vision 
of Buddhism had a role in the association of Buddhism and science. the 
great and obvious advantage of Buddhism in the eyes of a Westerner is that 
India	and	the	theory	of	relativity	or	of	quantum	physics	side	by	side.	See,	among	many	others,	Watts	(1951,	
pp. viii-ix),	Capra	(1975),	Teresi	(2002,	p.	210).
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no theodicy is necessary. in any event, the freedom Buddhism is supposed 
to have from theodicy (cf. obeyesekere, 1968) is not enough to explain its 
historical association with science, given that Hinduism and its historical 
antecedents, Vedism and Brahmanism, were associated with science as well. 
Moreover, a position like the one held by the Hindu and Buddhist apologists is 
not confined to religions of Indian origin. Even in the West it was claimed that 
Christianity can be reinterpreted as an essentially scientific doctrine: Christian 
Science comes to mind. in the same period in which the association between 
Buddhism and science flourishes, Mary Baker Eddy (1821-1910) asserts that 
Christianity is describable in terms of a coherent and demonstrable scientific 
whole, rather than a belief system or religion.12 Christian Science springs from 
the exact same rhetorical process from which ‘scientific Buddhism’ arises: 
because only science, in that era, enjoyed undisputed prestige, if one desired 
to exalt a particular faith, one needed to present it as scientific. Any religion 
could be reinterpreted as ‘scientific’. In brief, the history of the conjunction 
between Buddhism and science is part of the more general history of attempts 
to reconcile religion with science, and it was not determined by the specific 
characteristics of Buddhism. The alleged scientific nature of Buddhism is 
very often mentioned in popular literature just because Buddhism itself is 
frequently mentioned.
Lopez (2008, pp. 39-64) recounts various remarkable occasions on which 
Buddhism and science competed in the area of cosmological description. 
naturally, various reactions are possible with respect to the divergence 
between the cosmology attributed to the Buddha13 and that of modern science:
Some Buddhist thinkers wanted to keep Mount Meru on earth, yet beyond the reach 
of explorers. others placed it in outer space. Still others placed it in the category of 
the non-existent, consigned to the realm of myth, without fearing that any harm has 
been done to the dharma. (Lopez, 2008, p. 71)
As one can see, in a direct comparison, science has the power to 
constrain Buddhism to take a position on specific questions – and the gamut 
of reactions within Buddhism can be rather varied – profoundly modifying 
12 Eddy wrote in Science and Health	(p.	313):	“Jesus	of	Nazareth	was	the	most	scientific	man	that	ever	trod	
the	globe”.	And	again	(p.	496):	“Have	Christian	Scientists	any	religious	creed?	...	They	have	not,	if	by	that	
term	is	meant	doctrinal	beliefs”.	Compare	these	affirmations	with	those	of	a	“leading	personality	of	Buddhist	
modernism”	 such	as	 the	Singhalese	scholar	G.P.	Malalasekara	 (1899-1973):	 “The	Buddha	was	 the	first	
great	scientist	to	appear	among	men”	(cit.	in	Bechert,	1973,	p.	91).
13	 In	reality,	there	is	no	official	or	definitive	Buddhist	cosmology,	since	the	various	traditions	have	developed	
different	conceptions.
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the way Buddhist devotees perceive those questions. in recent times it has 
been reaffirmed that on the base of their alleged affinity Buddhism and science 
should interact along definite guidelines. The Dalai Lama (2006, pp. 3, 5-6; 
cf. also Lopez, 2008, pp. 69-70; McMahan, 2010, pp. 115-116) maintains 
that “if scientific analysis were conclusively to demonstrate certain claims in 
Buddhism to be false, then we [Buddhists] must accept the findings of science 
and abandon those claims”. therefore, science seems to impose an adjustment 
to current scientific theories on certain areas of Buddhist tradition. Another 
example of this comes from a research project on the possible psycho-physical 
effects of meditative practices. The experiments were conducted in 1993-1994 
with some expert tibetan monks who lived in semi-isolation in the mountains 
around Dharamsala.14 the implication of these experiments is evident: at least 
some Buddhist doctrines (belonging to Tibetan Buddhism, in this specific 
case) are seen as theories from which it is possible to extract consequences 
subject to factual checks. In other words, these theories are ‘falsifiable’ in a 
Popperian sense. And if these theories are falsifiable, then they are scientific. 
Logically, if the results of the experiments do not verify Buddhist ideas, these 
should be abandoned, as is usually done with falsified hypotheses. If, on the 
other hand, the results of these experiments verify Buddhist ideas, one can say 
that the theory is confirmed, at least for the moment. This way of proceeding 
also means that whatever falls within the Buddhist realm that is not ‘falsifiable’ 
or that cannot be represented within a theoretical model, from which one can 
draw consequences subject to experimental verification, can be considered 
a second class doctrine. or rather it can be abandoned by Buddhists without 
regrets, as is done by scientists with an ‘unfalsifiable’ hypothesis, which is, 
in the final analysis, unscientific. Similar experiments are conducted with the 
precise objective to verify or falsify specific Buddhist ideas, exactly because 
these ideas are considered at least potentially scientific, in virtue of the alleged 
more or less scientific nature of Buddhism. The superimposition of science on 
Buddhism is also presupposed by the fact that the expert monks involved in the 
experiments are paternalistically referred to not only as ‘subjects’, but also as 
‘collaborators’ (Houshmand et al., 2002, p. 4). to this may be added that, as is 
well known, no scientific theory as such is ever connoted by certainty, because 
it would be necessary to demonstrate that all of its consequences are true: an 
14	 The	object	of	the	experiments	is	described	as	follows:	“Conventionally	human	psychology	and	behavioral	
capacities	in	the	West	have	been	regarded	as	relatively	fixed	...	Buddhism,	in	contrast,	has	seen	the	human	
mind	as	trainable	...	What	substance	might	there	be	to	such	claims?	The	goal	was	to	bring	standard	scientific	
laboratory	methods	to	the	investigation	of	this	question”	(Houshmand	et al., 2002, p. 4).
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impossible operation, since the consequences are infinite. As the history of 
science teaches us, theories that have resisted for decades can crumble under 
the weight of new evidence. Buddhist ‘scientific-religious’ doctrines, including 
for example ‘compassion’ (Houshmand et al., 2002, p. 14), in good measure 
subject to the experiments cited above, would be candidates for substitution 
by new theories at any moment.
From a logical point of view there is another possible interpretation of the 
conjunction between Buddhism and science: an interaction in which Buddhism 
is in a dominant position, or in which the two are equals. Again, this is absurd. 
One need not dwell upon the fact that the formulation of models and scientific 
theories, by its nature, does not tolerate external influences: a theory or a 
scientific model cannot be correct on the basis of a Buddhist theory or model. 
that is due to the simple fact that while science lends itself to generating 
a broad consensus within society through public verifiability, Buddhism, 
however positively characterized it can be in the collective imagination, does 
not. Moreover, science is unable not to project its light onto whatever gets 
into a structured and organized relationship with it. In fact, scientific discourse 
has its own protocols, and must examine all that is subject to science and 
which will then become part of an explanation or theory. And how many 
aspects of Buddhism can survive “in the light of scientific knowledge”, 
how many can be constituted as experimentally verifiable theories? Perhaps 
some physiological changes produced by meditative practices can be proved 
(cf. Benson et al., 1982). Yet, how much is specifically Buddhist in these 
physiological alterations? Buddhism, in any event, risks having to abdicate 
its own specificity.
now, Lopez (2008, p. 216) points out that the history of the conjunction 
between the terms ‘science’ and ‘Buddhism’ induces us to doubt that Buddhism 
is “modern, au courant, up-to-date with the latest scientific discoveries”; what 
makes it difficult to see Buddhism as modern – and therefore appropriate to 
science – is the presence of “starkly premodern” or even “apparently exotic” 
elements in it. these elements cannot simply be removed, as the Dalai Lama 
would like, because they are “essential to what Buddhism has been, and is”. 
nevertheless, this does not explain why Buddhism should not give way to 
science, as the Dalai Lama openly asserts. on the contrary, this seems all the 
more a theoretical justification for why contemporary Buddhists should let 
go of their belief or practice, which is, at least in part, reduced to the rank of 
superstition. the description of Buddhism as ‘premodern’ does no more than 
confirm its subordination to science, which is ‘modern’ by definition. Can we 
be satisfied with this description of the relationship between Buddhism and 
335BUDDHISM AND MODERNITY: IN THE MARGIN OF DONALD S. LOPEZ JR.’S “BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE”
science, i.e., a relationship between ‘premodern’ and ‘modern’, which can 
only reveal itself immediately as a relationship of subordination?
As a matter of fact, the very idea of the plausibility of a conjunction 
between Buddhism and science is in itself contradictory, if examined up 
close. indeed, this idea has an important implication: that science and 
Buddhism are, at least partially, homogeneous. in fact, one does not expect 
the possibility of a structured and direct interaction between heterogeneous 
domains, as we would not expect one, for example, between art and law. And 
the heterogeneity of Buddhism and science appear incontestable at first sight. 
From a phenomenological point of view, it is evident that the paradigms that 
shape the two spheres operate very differently.15 It is sufficient to observe how, 
for example, among doctors Hippocratic medical theories today are outdated, 
to say the least, and discredited from the scientific perspective, while among 
Buddhists the central teachings of the Buddha enjoy as much prestige today 
as they did in the age in which they were first widespread. Naturally, even 
Buddhism is subject to the introduction of new paradigms: Mahāyāna 
Buddhism, for example, must have represented, at a certain moment, a new 
paradigm (or a collection of new paradigms) for Buddhism. nevertheless, the 
new paradigms can be refuted or simply disregarded here: for example, thai 
Buddhism, which is part of the Śrāvakayāna (the oldest form of Buddhism), 
disregards Mahāyāna Buddhism (Seyfort Ruegg, 2004). Instead, a scientist, 
contrary to a Buddhist, cannot permit himself to ignore the introduction of a 
new paradigm: how do many scientists reject the Copernican system in favor 
of the Ptolemaic model? Science is, indeed, sustained by broad agreement, 
including non-scientists as well, which springs from experimental control and 
reproducibility. Science, for better or worse, shapes society: for example, a 
doctor cures a patient according to the state of the art of medical science, 
namely in accordance with scientific progress. He could not do otherwise, at 
least not without the intention of breaking the law. it is evident that the same 
cannot be said for Buddhism: everyone in our society is free to make use of 
the oldest or most recent Buddhist paradigms or to ignore Buddhist doctrine 
altogether – at least while science and Buddhism are different. Therefore, 
from this point of view, Buddhism and science appear to be heterogeneous. 
As there is no reason why an affinity between Buddhist and science must be 
supposed, so there is no reason why a structured relationship between the two 
15	 Here	we	make	reference	to	Wuchterl’s	(1989,	p.	145)	linguistically	mediated	phenomenology.	On	the	use	
of	the	concept	of	paradigm	within	the	phenomenology	of	religion,	see	Wuchterl	(1989,	pp.	150-151)	once	
again.
Bruno Lo Turco336
must be programmed. Paradigms in the domain of Buddhism tend to operate 
like those in the realm of religions: new paradigms, despite being the product 
of ‘revolutions’, can coexist with the older ones for millennia. in other words, 
with a somewhat approximate synthesis one can say that, for Buddhism, the 
‘truth’ springs from the discussion about which texts or traditions contain the 
genuine ‘word of the Buddha’ (buddhavacana), while for science the ‘truth’ 
lies within a general consensus that is constantly renegotiated, usually through 
the mechanism of experimental verification, by peer reviews, etc. Only 
science, as a point of fact, is entitled to generate a broad, negotiable consensus 
in the contemporary world and is therefore less inclined to produce coercion 
– even if unfortunately it does so at times, especially when the historicity and 
finiteness of its language are not recognized.
It is not sufficient to point out that the premises of Buddhism understood 
as more or less essentially scientific are unstable. It is also necessary to 
highlight how the consequences of the adoption of this narrative can become 
undesirable. Lopez does so, in part by recognizing that the alleged scientific 
nature of Buddhism has a cost. According to Lopez (2008, p. 216) this cost 
consists in the loss of essential elements of Buddhism, for example the 
“invocation, incantation, visualization of the fantastic”. He tries, in essence, 
to save the ‘premodern’ elements of Buddhism. That which Lopez defines 
as ‘premodern’ is, in other words, that which is antithetical to science. And 
science is precisely that which qualifies modernity. If one more or less 
implicitly accepts a hierarchy of values based on greater or lesser modernity, it 
is obvious that Buddhism conceptually takes up an inferior position to that of 
science. nevertheless, Lopez omits a fundamental point here, namely how our 
‘modernity’, to which the ‘premodern’ elements of Buddhism are opposed, 
should be considered.
What is the role of science in our current modernity? When, with the intent 
to exploit the intellectual prestige that Western science enjoyed, the idea of a 
conjunction between Buddhism and science was born, that prestige was still far 
from being questioned. Today, instead, it is more and more difficult to question 
“the simple fact that technological progress is leading in so many instances 
straight into disaster” (Arendt, 1970, p. 16). Despite the disappearance of the 
fundamental historical presupposition of the conjunction between Buddhism 
and science, namely the absoluteness of the prestige of science, few voices 
have been heard, on the part of Buddhologists or scientists, against the bizarre 
idea of the scientific nature of Buddhism.16 And yet, in our modernity nothing 
16	 Among	these,	in	addition	to	those	already	mentioned	by	Lopez	(2008),	see	Verhoeven	(2001)	and	Johnson	
(2006).	See	also	the	discussion	between	Johnson	(2005)	and	Wallace	(2006).
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obliges us to make Buddhism and science coexist within the same milieu. Such 
an idea is the expression of a hoary conception, typical of scientism, which 
puts into a global order all of the expressions of human knowledge, including 
Buddhism and science, on the basis of the criterion of their greater or lesser 
approximation to an extra-linguistic reality. The supposed affinity of science 
and Buddhism does not respect the specificity of the rules that govern each of 
the two linguistic games.17 thus it gives rise to the (re-)creation of a totalizing 
meta-narrative and to a loss of ideodiversity.18 Affirming that the search for 
the ‘truth’ is the most important objective for both science and Buddhism 
is equivalent to setting up a linguistic meta-game in which it is possible to 
formulate universal statements that adhere to the ‘truth’. the obvious danger 
of not recognizing the difference between Buddhism and science is that the 
experimental aspect, which is the specific domain of science, takes the place 
of what is the specific domain of Buddhism.19 the conception of Buddhism 
and science as two different linguistic games allows us instead to invalidate 
the three possible relationship modalities. Buddhism and science are not in 
conflict, they are neither compatible/identical nor complementary precisely 
because they are two totally different linguistic games.
However, it is true that the idea of the conjunction between Buddhism and 
science, as McMahan (2004, p. 926) aptly points out, is not just a problem of 
how Buddhism is thought of – as perhaps already in the times of Dharmapala 
was not the case (cf. Harrison, 2010, p. 865) – but rather of “a concrete and 
highly significant transformation of Buddhist traditions themselves”. In 
other words, the process of hybridization with science is actually changing 
Buddhism. nevertheless, the fact that the process is already underway does 
not mean that its premises are solid or that we must abstain from pointing out 
the dangers. in fact, for example, every totalizing meta-narrative is generally 
the tool of, or at least tied to, authoritarian pretenses. its bearers tend to adopt 
coercive measures against anyone who does not share the narrative. this is 
exactly the case with those who maintain that the hermeneutical orientation 
is to be considered outdated by now (for example Baggini, 2002; De Caro, 
17	 Here	we	make	use	of	the	celebrated	conception	of	language	game	proposed	by	Lyotard	(1979),	following	
Wittgenstein.
18	 According	to	an	author	like	McMahan	(2010,	p.	857)	Buddhism	has	no	need	to	be	defended	by	science,	
because	it	is	not	necessary	to	see	the	“modernization	as	inevitably	impoverishing	and	trivializing”.	McMahan,	
indeed,	attacks	Lopez	(2008)	because	he	assumes	a	“curatorial	role”.	The	fact	that	Loizzo	(2010)	attacks	
Lopez	for	the	opposite	reasons,	namely	an	excess	of	the	de-mythologization	of	Buddhism,	indicates	how	
balanced	Lopez’s	position	is.
19	 Radically	different	is	the	vision	of	various	authoritative	exponents	of	contemporary	Tibetan	Buddhism,	who	
still attribute an ultimate prestige to science. See, for example, Thupten Jinpa (2010, p. 881).
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Ferraris, 2012; Ferraris, 2012).20 this thesis can easily accompany political 
projects that barely mask their totalitarian tendency, be it leftwing or rightwing.
Due to its particular history in the West, Buddhism seems to lend itself 
particularly to a legitimization of the pretenses of hierarchical dominance 
on the part of science. ‘Scientific Buddhism’ revives the great speculative 
narration that represented the discourse legitimating the primacy of scientific 
knowledge. that (re-)narration, when enlivened by Buddhism, proves to be 
much more convincing, in so far as Buddhism is positively qualified in the 
average Western imagination and frequently tied to environmentalism and a 
commitment to social causes (e.g. Seager, 1999, pp. 201-215). on the other 
hand, what is the ‘truth’ of science and of Buddhism if not the mirror image of 
the unchanging structure that is the alleged foundation of human knowledge 
and action, i.e., the God of the great philosophical-religious synthesis, a fruit 
of metaphysical thought? religion and science were, in the age of Positivism, 
two sides of the same coin. the concept of the law of nature, a law ‘written’ 
by God, is the perfect precipitate of the solution formed by theology and 
natural science (cf. Harrison, 2008, p. 257). When religion and science began 
being painted in sharp contrast by Positivism, Positivism itself unwittingly 
continued to cultivate a vision of science that still made it something akin 
to religion. even neo-Positivism and new realism cultivate the pretense 
that there is an extra-linguistic truth beyond history, on the basis of which 
human affairs can be evaluated. This claim represents the vain effort to beat 
metaphysically founded religion on its own ground.
in brief, one does not see either why or how science and Buddhism should 
be seen as homogeneous. Such an idea could satisfactorily be abandoned by 
both parties. Buddhism would preserve its own specificity, while science 
could save itself the embarrassment of having to force Buddhists – who have 
by now surpassed the phase of naïve enthusiasm that proclaimed the direct 
identity of karman and evolution, etc. – to discard the whole of their own 
physics, cosmology and psychology.
Even though Buddhism has been called “a body of systematic knowledge 
about the natural world” (Wallace, 2003b, p. 58), within it paradigms take 
turns according to the modality that is typical of any religion. if observed from 
the point of view of alternating paradigms, the problem of the relationship 
between Buddhism and science is in reality the problem of the relationship 
20	 Against	them	one	may	highlight	Ferrara’s	(2005)	synthetic,	but	comprehensive,	defense	of	the	hermeneutical	
stance.
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between religion and science.21 therefore it is a question of examining the 
relationship between religion and science (cf. Harrison, 2010, p. 864). this 
examination has been going on for centuries in the West and has resulted 
in a well defined outcome, namely in allocating the area of cooperation to 
science, removing religion from the ‘epistemic arena’. And religion must be 
withdrawn from the epistemic arena, which should be reserved for scientific 
theories and relevant programs of inquiry, not only to avoid subjecting 
science to its hegemonic pretenses, but also so that religion is not subjected 
to the hegemonic pretenses of science (cf. Harrison, 2006, p. 103). the fact 
that religion must be removed from the epistemic arena does not imply that 
religion is irrational, while science is rational, as Positivism would have it. 
In the hermeneutical perspective, they are merely two different linguistic 
games: one is more adept at producing functional and innovative projects of 
social cooperation, while the other is more adept at flourishing in the personal 
sphere. therefore the religious necessities of human consciousness need not be 
examined by Positivistic criticism (cf. rorty, 2005, p. 40). As a matter of fact, 
in our modernity the need for normative coordination of the whole of human 
knowledge has fallen away. it is not necessary to reconcile the description of 
the world peculiar to science with the vision of the world peculiar to religion 
or, more specifically, to Buddhism.22 it makes sense to integrate two branches 
of scientific knowledge, like chemistry and medicine, for example, while it 
does not make sense to attempt a programmed integration between art and 
morals or religion and science. there is no need for an organizational diagram 
that specifies how and when those spheres should be integrated (cf. Rorty, 
2005, p. 35). And again, there is no need to set up and maintain an institutional 
dialogue between Buddhism and science. if anything, the interaction of 
science and religion should pertain to the individual dimension (cf. Harrison, 
2006, p. 105), where all cultural domains already permeate and continually 
interact spontaneously with one another. Although Cabezón (2003), as already 
cited, paints a succinct and deft portrait of the complexity of the possible 
modalities of interaction between Buddhism and science “in structural and 
typological, rather than historical terms”, he does not even provide a glimpse 
of a modality of interaction between Buddhism and science in which such 
a contact arises freely, in a non-preorganized and non-institutional manner, 
21	 There	do	not	seem	to	be	many	doubts	among	valued	scholars	about	the	fact	that	Buddhism	is	a	religion;	see	
Southwold	(1978)	and	Pyysiäinen	(2003).	
22	 Loizzo	(2010,	p.	108),	who	moves	from	metaphysical	positions	to	attack	Lopez’s	“deconstructive	method”,	
maintains	 explicitly	 instead	 that	 these	 days	 one	must	make	 a	 concerted	 effort	 to	 coordinate	 all	 human	
knowledge,	just	as	was	done	in	traditional	Buddhist	universities.
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within the individual sphere. And yet this obvious modality, in which Buddhism 
and science combine in a non-preorganized manner within the domain of the 
individual – or maybe in the family, or in a small community – is the one 
which, logically and as a matter of fact, is already realized more frequently 
than any other.23
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